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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between patenting and publication of research results by university faculty members.
Our study adds to the limited evidence on this topic with an empirical investigation based on a panel data set for a broad sample
of university researchers. Results suggest that publication and patenting are complementary, not substitute, activities for faculty
members. This is not consistent with recent concerns regarding deleterious effects of patenting on the research output of faculty
members. Average citations to publications, however, appear to decline for repeat patenters, suggesting either a decrease in quality
or restrictions on use associated in patent protection.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
University research has traditionally been associated
with norms of rapid disclosure of research results and
an environment of knowledge sharing, co-authorship,
and joint projects that contribute to cumulative learning
and innovation (Dasgupta and David, 1994). The reward
system for faculty provides incentives for being first to
discover and disclose new research results, and valuable
reputations are built on diffusion of these results among
the scientific community. Faculty members therefore
have the incentive to pursue impactful research prob-
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doi:10.1016/j.respol.2008.01.010lems and disclose research results openly and quickly
(David, 1998; David et al., 1992). These activities stim-
ulate the cumulative research process by facilitating the
generating of fundamental discoveries and the transfer of
knowledge among researchers. These norms and incen-
tives are being challenged by the increasing patenting of
university research results. In this study, we examine the
relationship between a faculty member’s involvement in
patenting research results and the quantity and quality of
publications generated. Our goal is to evaluate the recent
concerns that patenting negatively affects the generation
and publication of academic research.
This is an important question because academic
research results contribute substantially to the industrial
R&D process (Mansfield, 1991, 1995, 1998; Narin et
al., 1997). To varying degrees, respondents in all indus-
tries report that a significant percentage of their product
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nd process innovations could not have been developed
ithout academic research, or would have been substan-
ially delayed. University research was reported as an
mportant source of new projects for 31% of respon-
ents and an important source of information for 36% of
espondents (Cohen et al., 2002). In their survey of R&D
anagers across many industries, Cohen et al. (2002)
nd that the most important channel for knowledge trans-
er from universities or government labs is publication
f the research, followed by informal exchange, public
eetings or conferences, and consulting. Patents were
anked as one of the least important transfer channels.1
herefore, it is important both that academics continue
o pursue fundamental research question and that they
ontinue to publish their research findings.
There is reason to believe that the influence of
atenting and commercialization activity on university
esearchers has grown in recent years. Since the late
970s, the university research environment has changed
ramatically. Policy changes, such as the Bayh-Dole
ct of 1980,2 encouraged commercialization of univer-
ity research results by standardizing policies granting
ntellectual property rights to university researchers for
utcomes of federally under research.3 At the time, fed-
rally funded research made up approximately 70% of
niversity research.4 In addition, sources of academic
esearch funding shifted substantially from the 1970s
o the 1980s to include more industry funding and less
overnment funding (Mansfield, 1995).5 Universities
nderwent organizational changes to attempt to better
romote the commercialization of university research
1 The pharmaceutical industry stands in contrast to these generaliza-
ions, with more knowledge transfer through the information disclosed
n patents.
2 Patent and Trademark Act Amendments (P.L. 96-517).
3 See Jaffe (2000) and Mowery and Ziedonis (2001) for a more
xtensive history of the policy changes.
4 University faculty members do hold patents from prior to the pas-
age of the Bayh-Dole Act. Some of these inventions were not patented
hrough the university (i.e. they were patented by firms with which the
aculty member worked or they were patented by the faculty person
ndividually and not assigned to the university). However, even before
he Bayh-Dole Act, universities could and did patent some inventions
rom faculty research. For example, the famous Cohen and Boyer
atent on recombinant DNA technology was applied for in 1979 and
s assigned to Stanford University. The importance of the Bayh-Dole
ct is that it streamlined and standardized the rights of universities
ith respect to intellectual property stemming from federally funded
esearch.
5 Industry funding of university research increased from $630 mil-
ion to $1.896 billion between 1985 and 1998, university-industry joint
&D centers grew 60% during the 1980s, and the number of univer-
ity offices of technology transfer increased more than 800% between
980 and 1995 (Cohen et al., 2002).h Policy 37 (2008) 914–931 915
results (Argyres and Leibeskind, 1998). In response to
these policy, institutional, and market changes, patent-
ing by university researchers increased dramatically in
the last two decades (Henderson et al., 1998a,b). This
increase in patent volume was accompanied by a sig-
nificant increase in the number of universities that were
patenting innovations Henderson et al. (1998a).6 Pro-
viding researchers with the incentive to patent their
findings may encourage commercialization of research
findings, as intended by the Bayh-Dole Act. How-
ever, the increased focus on patenting may also lead
to increased secrecy, delayed publication, and a shift
in faculty research effort and time away from scien-
tific research and toward commercialization activities,
thereby decreasing the production and/or quality of sci-
entific publications.
The existing empirical studies that attempt to uncover
the relationship between academic patenting and pub-
lishing activities have presented contradictory pictures.
Several surveys of academic researchers have docu-
mented the secrecy, delay of publication, and re-focusing
of research activities that accompany involvement in
patenting and commercialization activities (Blumenthal
et al., 1996a,b; Campbell et al., 2002). However, the
few existing studies of individual research publishing
and patenting activities have failed to find such a neg-
ative impact. Agrawal and Henderson (2002) examine
the patenting and publishing of faculty members in two
departments at MIT (Mechanical and Electrical Engi-
neering), and find no relationship between patenting and
the generation of publications, but do find that the num-
ber of citations to publications is positively related to
the level of patenting, which they interpret as evidence
that patenting is positively correlated with the impact of
research. Azoulay et al. (2004) examine the publication
activity of faculty members in the life sciences field and
find a positive relationship between patenting and the
generation of publication, but do not examine citations
to the publications. Positive correlations between pub-
lishing and patenting can be found in recent empirical
investigations of non-U.S. context (Breschi et al., 2005;
Buenstorf, 2006; Looy et al., 2005). Interestingly, Buen-
storf’s investigation of publishing behavior of Max Plant
Institutes’ Directors show that the positive correlation
6 Mowery and Ziedonis (2001) find that of the 224 universities with
patents issued after 1980, 51 universities had 10 or more issued patents
applied for between 1970 and 1980, 92 universities had fewer than 10
issued patents during 1970–1980, and 81 universities has no patents
issued during 1970–1980. This indicates the significant entry of inex-
perienced and less experienced universities into the pool of patenting
universities.
Researc
the academic community, the reward structure remains
primarily focused on publications.8 Therefore, faculty
members with research results that are patentable and
also publishable are likely to publish the results even if
7 Note that this conceptualization is implicitly conditional on the
faculty researcher remaining in academia. Career effects of university
patenting is a topic of future research.
8 Based on a study of French academics, Carayol (2004) finds that the
usual academic reward system does not provide incentives for patent-916 K.R. Fabrizio, A. Di Minin /
between publishing and patenting is somehow weakened
in the few cases where the disclosed inventions were
commercialized.
This study extends the existing literature in several
ways. First, we draw from a broad sample of institu-
tions and fields in which patenting is occurring, rather
than focusing on one institution or one academic area.
We develop a matched sample of non-patenting faculty
researchers, and employ researcher-level fixed effects to
estimate the relationship between patenting and annual
publications or average citations to publications. This
generates results that are more generalizable than some
of the other studies. Second, we investigate the differ-
ential impacts of university, industry, and unassigned
patents. Third, we examine the possibility that the num-
ber of patents held has a curvilinear relationship with the
number of publications generated. Finally, our analysis
controls for current researcher quality differently than
this existing work and results suggest that these controls
are important.
Our findings are consistent with most of these stud-
ies, importantly contradict some results, and extend this
body of literature. Results presented here indicate that
publication and patenting are complementary activities,
but the positive relationship between them declines with
an increasing number of cumulative patents held by the
faculty researcher. Although we caution against causal
interpretation of these results, this evidence suggests
that faculty researchers are not generating less scien-
tific research or limiting the open publication of research
results as they patent, with the possible exception of a
few very patent-intensive faculty members. Results of
the analysis of citations to faculty publications indicate
that the number of citations to a faculty members’ pub-
lications is related to the productivity of the researchers,
but not substantially different following the first patent
by the faculty member. In fact, the citation intensity falls
as a faculty member repeatedly patents his or her research
results. This is contradictory to the limited previous evi-
dence. Although we are focused on average quality and
impact of publications rather than the citation patterns
associated with an individual paper, our results are con-
sistent with the anti-commons hypothesis put forth and
tested by Murray and Stern (2005).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
The next section considers the possible relationship
between faculty publishing and patenting activities and
develops the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes
our sample and data, summary statistics of which are
reported in Section 4. Section 5 presents our empirical
strategy and results with respect to the production of
publications by faculty members. Section 6 continuesh Policy 37 (2008) 914–931
by exploring the relationship between patenting and the
number of citations to these publications. Limitations of
the study are discussed in Section 7, and conclusions are
provided in Section 8.
2. How are patents and publications related?
We focus our study at the researcher level, allowing
us to explore individual trade-offs and complemen-
tarities between patenting and publication for faculty
researchers.7 There are competing factors which may
drive the relationship between patenting and publica-
tion in opposite directions. The null hypothesis is that
faculty publication is unrelated to patenting: if the fac-
ulty member chooses to apply for patent protection for
some of his research discoveries, this does not change
his production of publications from what it would have
been. The two alternatives we consider and test for are
that publication and patenting may be either complemen-
tary or substitute activities for faculty members in U.S.
universities.
2.1. Patenting and publishing may be complements
University researchers may experience some comple-
mentarities between patenting and publishing. First and
foremost, the same research stream may naturally lead
to publications and yield patents. Faculty researchers
interviewed by Agrawal and Henderson (2002) stated
that “most patentable research is also publishablepatent-
inten,” and that the decision of whether or not to
patent research is something that happens after the
research process, not in the selection of research projects.
The academic norm of rewarding priority in disclo-
sure of research results provides incentive for rapid
open publication of research results by faculty mem-
bers (David, 1998). Although patents may be valued bying by faculty members. “The reputational reward of patents within
the academic community seems to be low: Career profiles and patent
production are not related,” (Carayol, 2004). This may be less true in
U.S. universities, some of which have begun to focus on patenting as
well as publication in promotion decisions.
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hey are also patented, although they may wait until the
atent application is filed to submit the publication.9
In addition, the experience of patenting, licensing, and
orking with the licensee to transfer technology may
rompt additional research questions. As the licensee
orks to develop the patented innovation, the univer-
ity researcher may learn or encounter challenges that
oint to new research questions. Academic researchers
eport that problems they work on in academic research
ften come from ideas and problems encountered dur-
ng industrial consulting (Mansfield, 1995). A survey of
cientists found that 65% of researchers reported that
nteraction with industry has influenced their research.
ne respondent commented, “There is no doubt that
orking with industry scientists has made me a better
esearcher. They help me refine my experiments and
ometimes have a different perspective on a problem
hat sparks my own ideas” (Siegel et al., 1999). This
nvolvement and feedback may produce additional pub-
ications and potentially additional patents. University
esearcher involvement in commercialization activities
ay also provide information to the researcher about
he relative value of various research streams, much as
esearch grants and consulting have, and continue to do
Feller, 1990).10
Patenting of university research by a faculty mem-
er may also increase incentives for that researcher to
ublish more articles related to the patented research.
ublications may serve as a type of advertisement,
ncreasing the awareness and knowledgability of the rel-
vant scientific community with regard to the patented
echnology. This can raise the value of the patented
esearch because it increases the legitimacy of the tech-
ology and creates a set of researchers who know about
nd may be interested in utilizing the patented research.
Finally, patenting, and the subsequent (potential)
icensing revenue and industry involvement may allow a
niversity researcher access to additional funding (either
rom licensing revenue or industry funding) that he could
pend on additional equipment, researchers, and junior
9 There is a 1-year grace period following publication during which
U.S. patent must be filed before the published research is considered
n the public domain. In order to avoid potential problems, some uni-
ersity administrators and faculty have instituted a conservative policy
f submitting the publication and patent at roughly the same time. A
atenting MIT faculty member that we spoke with stated that there
sed to be conflict between open publication and patenting, but that
hey had solved this by waiting to submit their publication until they
ubmitted their patent application.
10 In addition, collaborating with industry researchers may facilitate
lacement of PhD graduates (Adams et al., 2005), which could lead to
ontinuing research funding and collaboration.h Policy 37 (2008) 914–931 917
faculty members, all of which could contribute positively
to the publications and patents produced by the lab. The
respondent quoted above stated, “Also, my involvement
with firms has allowed me to purchase better equipment
for my lab, which means I can conduct more experi-
ments,” (Siegel et al., 1999). This may be reflected in
both an increase in the productivity of the university
research and an increased lab size, with more researchers
working under the inventing faculty member.
These drivers all lead to the expectation that faculty
members that patent will subsequently generate more
publications. Hence, our first hypothesis is
Hypothesis 1. The number of publications generated
by a faculty researcher will be higher following the appli-
cation for a patent by the researcher.
2.2. Patenting and publishing may be substitutes
Alternatively, there are several reasons that a uni-
versity researcher involved in patenting might publish
fewer articles than he or she otherwise would have. First,
involvement in patenting and commercialization activi-
ties may detract from the researcher’s time and attention
paid to scientific research. As researchers become more
involved in the patenting process, and spends time locat-
ing licensees for their patents or working with the
licensee to transfer the technology, time spent doing
research may be compromised. The analysis here can-
not explore the effect of licensing or commercialization
activities directly because we do not have data on these
activities. However, these activities are likely to be
positively correlated with patenting, and therefore the
relationship between patenting and publishing may be
confounded by the influences of licensing and commer-
cialization activities.
Second, patenting and licensing changes the incen-
tives faced by the faculty members. According to the
traditional norms of academic promotion, faculty mem-
bers are rewarded for novel, fundamental discoveries
generated and openly published in the scientific lit-
erature. The possibility to license-patented research
provides an incentive for researchers to focus more time
on research projects with more commercial potential.
This may encourage a shift of resources away from fun-
damental research and toward commercially oriented
research at the expense of more basic, fundamental, and
publishable research projects.Third, growing awareness and attention paid to intel-
lectual property concerns may make researchers more
inclined to secrecy, and less willing to openly share and
publish research results. Thursby and Thursby (2000)
Researc
subject, PhD granting institution, and PhD date. For fac-
ulty members that received their MD instead of PhD,
we also use the American Medical Association Physi-
11 A similar empirical approach has been taken by Buenstorf (2006),
as they considered longitudinal patent and publication data to explore
the effects of patenting, licensing, and commercialization on the pro-
ductivity of researchers.
12 This was done manually by comparing the address, assignee, and
technology class for all patents potentially attributable to each inventor918 K.R. Fabrizio, A. Di Minin /
report that more than half of the firms responding to
their survey include delay of publication clauses in at
least 90% of their university contracts. Several surveys
(Louis et al., 2001; Blumenthal et al., 1996a,b; Campbell
et al., 2002) have found that industry funding, commer-
cial goals, and patenting have led researchers to increase
secrecy with regard to research methodology and results.
Blumenthal et al. (1996a,b) surveyed companies that
fund life sciences research at universities and found that
47% of the respondents reported that their agreements
with universities occasionally require that the univer-
sity protect the confidentiality of research results for
longer than is necessary for a patent application. In addi-
tion, faculty themselves sometimes delay publication in
order to protect the confidentiality or financial value of
the results (Blumenthal et al., 1996a,b). This extends
the desire for secrecy from the research result being
patented to related results, methodologies, and streams of
research.
These reasons combine to form our second hypothe-
sis:
Hypothesis 2. The number of publications generated
by a faculty researcher will be lower following the appli-
cation for a patent by the researcher.
It may also be the case that the first few patents by
a researcher provide many of the positive benefits of
patenting, such as interactions with industry researchers,
while faculty researchers who patent many of their
research results may be afflicted with some of the neg-
ative influences of patenting, such as limited time or
industry capture. Managing the patenting process for one
patent that happened to come out of research being done
by a researcher is substantially different than altering a
research trajectory to focus on more patentable research
projects. We therefore also examine the curvilinear rela-
tionship that may exist if the negative influences become
more important as the number of faculty member patents
increases:
Hypothesis 3. There is an inverted-U relationship
between the cumulative number of patents granted to
a researcher and the number of publications by the
researcher.
3. Sample and dataThe empirical analysis relies on developing a sam-
ple of university researchers that have patented their
research results and a corresponding sample of univer-
sity researchers that have not patented research results.h Policy 37 (2008) 914–931
By collecting publication and patent count data for a long
time period, we are able to examine a given researcher
over time, as well as compare that researcher with the
non-patenting control sample.11
This analysis requires two data sets: data on patents
for all faculty members in the inventor sample and
data on publications for all faculty members in both
the inventor and non-inventor (control) samples. We
have constructed these data sets from existing public
sources, making new use of data sets that have been
exploited for other purposes by combining patenting and
publication data at the individual researcher level with
researcher characteristics. The patent data is collected
using the NBER patent databases (Hall et al., 2001).
Using information on the inventors and assignees for
all U.S. utility patents applied for between 1975 and
1995, we create a panel data set of patent information for
each inventor in our sample. Because the inventor name
data field in this database is uncleaned, data construc-
tion requires manually searching the inventor database
to identify all permutations (i.e. various abbreviations
and misspellings) of a given name that were truly the
same inventor and exclude others with similar or identi-
cal names.12 For each inventorsample faculty member,
we assembled a panel data set of the number of successful
university-assigned, unassigned, and industry-assigned
patents applied for in each year. For each inventor and
control sample member, we construct a data set contain-
ing the number of publications in each year from the
Science Citation Index.13
For each member of the inventor and control sample,
we also collect data on their field, current institution, the
year in which they received their PhD, and the degree
granting institution. The first two of these data items are
collected from web searches. The PhD date and institu-
tion come primarily from the UMI International Digital
Dissertations database, which includes records of dis-
sertations filed since 1861, including author name, title,and excluding those patents that did not fit the profile of the inventor
in the sample. A similar method, automated for application to a much
larger sample, is described by Trajtenberg (2005).
13 The source we used is the ISI Web of Knowledge online at
http://isi3.isiknowledge.com/portal.cgi/wos.
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ian Select, which provides biographical information on
embers of the medical profession. Finally, for faculty
embers who do not appear in either of these databases,
e relied on information from their web page or other
eb-based information.
.1. Faculty inventor sample
Our goal for the inventor sample is for the sample to
epresent the fields in which university researchers are
atenting and not limit our sample to researchers at one or
few universities. This allows for a broad, but unbiased,
xploration of patenting behavior. We begin with a ran-
om sample of inventors on university-assigned patents.
e then verify that they are indeed faculty members, and
ollect the necessary data for each.
We draw the sample of university inventors from
he NBER database of patents and inventors (Hall et
l., 2001). For the 23,930 university-assigned patents
pplied for between 1975 and 1995, there are 26,880
nique first name–last name combinations for inven-
ors listed. Of these, there are 11,642 unique names that
ppear as the first inventor on the patent.14 A random
ample of 400 of these 11,642 inventors was selected.
closer examination of these names yielded a sample
f 384 that were truly unique. Based on web searches of
he inventor name and assignee institution, we attempted
o locate the inventor, confirm that he or she is a faculty
ember, and collect information on date of PhD, position
eld, gender, and departmental affiliation of the inven-
or. Of these 384, 230 faculty inventors were found and
onfirmed as faculty.15 Others were not found, work-
ng in industry, non-faculty, retired or deceased prior to
995, or located outside the U.S. For each of the 230
emaining inventor sample members, we collect data
n publications and citations and PhD date. A common
14 We found that it was much easier to locate information on the first
nventors, which is why we use this in the selection of the sample.
his may introduce some bias. It is possible that being first on a patent
epresents heading up the team of inventors, and so may also indicate
ome success in research. However, in some fields the lab director
ppears last on the patent. Correspondence with university inventors in
everal fields indicate that the meaning of first inventor varies by field.
t is true that university inventors who ever appear as the first inventor
n a patent are, on average, inventors on more patents. For this reason,
ur sample can be seen as composed on university researchers who are
ore heavily involved in patenting. This may limit the generalizability
f our results. However, for the goal of evaluating potential negative
ffects of patenting activity, if may be the most appropriate sample.
15 Although manually verifying each inventor is time consuming and
ecessitates a limited sample size, the alternative pursued by Azoulay
t al. (2004) is to drop individuals who seem to drop out of academia
ased on their publication record.h Policy 37 (2008) 914–931 919
name prevented collection of publication data for 39 of
these people, and no PhD date information was available
for 25 of them.
3.2. Control sample
For each of the 166 remaining inventors in the sam-
ple, we select the faculty member currently in the
same department at the same institution with the clos-
est PhD date that IS NOT recorded as an inventor on any
U.S. patents.16 Similar matching between inventors and
non-inventors has been used in other empirical investi-
gators. Two studies replicate the already cited study by
(Agrawal and Henderson, 2002) in two European institu-
tions: Buenstorf (2006) compares publication behavior
of inventor and non-inventor Directors of the Max Plant
Institutes in Germany, while Looy et al. (2005) focus
on the K.U. Leuven in Belgium. A more similar cross-
institutional analysis is attempted in Breschi et al. (2005),
where the authors look at the entire population of patent-
ing faculty from Italian universities, matching them with
non-inventors from the same disciplinary fields. Each of
these three studies construct their control groups match-
ing inventors with non-inventors belonging to the same
disciplinary fields and with similar PhD years.
For each control member, we also collected infor-
mation on publications and PhD date. For eight of the
inventors, no acceptable match was available, and for
eight of the control members, a common name pre-
vented collection of publication data. In order to maintain
our matched sample, dropping these control members
required also excluding the inventor match from the anal-
ysis. This left us with a sample of 300 total researchers,
evenly split between inventors and non-inventors.
By matching the control sample based on insti-
tution and department, we approximate a quality
match as closely as possible.17 In addition, by match-
ing at the institution level, the inventor and control
sample members are operating under the same institu-
16 For each faculty member selected for the control sample, a search
was done on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) website
for matching inventors. If any inventors were found that could reason-
ably be judged to match the faculty member in question, based on name
and location, a different member of the same department at the same
institution was selected for the control sample. We also matched the
faculty members based on position (i.e. Professor, Associate Professor,
etc.).
17 This method of matched sample development is similar to that
used, for example, by Trajtenberg et al. (1997) to match university and
corporate patents, by Almeida (1996) to match the patents of foreign
and U.S. firms, and by Remafedi et al. (1998) to match bisexual and
homosexual high school students.
Research Policy 37 (2008) 914–931
Table 1
Summary of inventor and control sample, 1975–1995
Inventors Non-inventors
Number 150 150
Mean PhD date 1973 1973
Percentage in:
Mechanical Engineering (%) 7 7
Computer Science/Electrical
Engineering (%)
11 11
Medical (%) 31 31
Chemistry (%) 12 12
Biomedical/Genetics/
Microbiology (%)
17 17
Chemical Engineering/Materials
Science (%)
10 10
Physics (%) 2 2
Other Science—Plant and Animal
Sciences (%)
6 6
Behavioral, Philosophy, Cognitive
Science (%)
3 3
Percentage that are:
Professors (%) 75 76
Assoc. Professors (%) 11 13
Assistant Professors (%) 0 1
150 faculty inventors hold only one patent), while a few
inventors hold many patents (five faculty inventors hold
50 patents or more, while only one holds more than 100920 K.R. Fabrizio, A. Di Minin /
tional environment. As Owen-Smith and Powell (2001)
describe, institutional characteristics strongly influence
the propensity of faculty members to patent. Matching
on the PhD date allows approximate cohort matching.
Additional criteria for matching based on characteris-
tics indicating research quality, such as grant monies
received, would be desirable as well, but such data was
not available in this case.
Although the analysis below uses researcher level
fixed effects to control for time-invariant heterogene-
ity across individuals and controls for the average life
cycle pattern of publications, the control sample is use-
ful as a comparison group. Since all faculty members in
the inventor sample do patent at some point during their
(observed) careers, their publication activity in the later
years of their careers may be affected by the patenting.
Therefore, the average life cycle pattern described by the
publication activity of the inventor sample alone may be
affected by patenting, and thus may not be an adequate
control for the actual life cycle pattern. For example, if
we were to only examine the inventor faculty members,
and if patenting is associated with a subsequent drop in
publication production, the life cycle effects will be bias
(downward) in the later years and will pick up the drop
in publications as part of the “natural” life cycle of fac-
ulty members. Likewise, if patenting is associated with
a subsequent increase in publications, the increase will
appear to be part of the common life cycle. In either case,
the coefficients on the patenting variable will be biased
toward zero. Therefore, we use the control sample in the
analysis, and include estimates using only the inventor
sample for comparison.
4. Summary statistics
By constructing the non-inventor control sample to
be as similar as possible (along observable dimensions)
to the inventor sample, we arrive at a well-matched pair
of samples. The comparative summary statistics for the
control and inventor sample are reported in Table 1.
There may be some remaining concern that faculty mem-
bers engaged in patenting during their career may be
doing inherently different work than the faculty members
that never patent, resulting in unobserved heterogene-
ity across researchers in the sample. In the analysis
below, we control for unobserved heterogeneity using
researcher-level fixed effects.
We limit our observations to the year of and all years
following the PhD date of each sample member. This
results in 5461 observations at the researcher-year level.
For the 1975–1995 sample period, our data covers 1545
patents by inventor sample inventors, 1184 of which areProfessors Emeritus (%) 9 7
Research Professors (%) 5 4
university-assigned, 274 are assigned to corporate enti-
ties, and 87 are unassigned. A histogram of the number of
patents held by the faculty inventors in our sample is dis-
played in Fig. 1 and the summary statistics of the number
of patent by type of assignee are reported in Table 2. The
distribution of the number of patents from 1975 to 1995
is highly skewed toward one or a few patents (18 of theFig. 1. Histogram of total patents per inventor.
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Table 2
Summary statistics of total patents per faculty inventor by type
Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
University patents 1 117 7.9 12.6
Industry patents 0 58 2.0 5.8
Unassigned patents 0 25 0.6 2.4
All patents 1 118 10.5 15.4
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sig. 2. Number of sample inventor faculty patents by assignee type.
atents).18 Over the 1975–1995 period, the average num-
er of university patents per year per inventor increased
rom about two to greater than three, while the number
f industry-assigned patents increased slightly and the
umber of unassigned patents remained approximately
onstant (see Fig. 2).
For the 1975–1995 period, our data cover 17,063
ublications for members of the inventor and control
ample. Fig. 3 displays a histogram of the number of
otal publications during this period held by sample fac-
lty member. Although the distribution is skewed to the
eft, it is flatter and has more mass at the higher values
han the histogram of patents above.19 Table 3 provides
he annual and total summary statistics for the entire
ample and by inventor status. A difference of means
est for the number of publications per year for inven-
ors and non-inventors suggests that those researchers
olding a patent applied for between 1975 and 1995
enerate significantly more publications per year than
18 The faculty member that holds more than 100 patents is a professor
n the biochemistry department at the University of Wisconsin. He
olds 28 patents that were applied for prior to the passage of the Bayh-
ole Act.
19 This is consistent with the data summary reported by Agrawal and
enderson (2002), although the distribution of publications in their
ample is noticeably flatter.Fig. 3. Histogram of total publications per researcher.
non-inventors.20 Table 5 provides summary statistics for
the variables used in the analysis, for the full sample as
well as for the inventor and non-inventor subsamples.
5. Empirical analysis and results
With this data, we are able to test the competing
hypotheses described above. Before assessing within
faculty member changes in publications, it is interest-
ing to briefly explore the differences across faculty
members. Simple correlation coefficients across all sam-
ple members tell the basic story. There are significant
positive correlations between publications and lagged
publications, patents and lagged patents, publications
and lagged patents, and patents and lagged publications
(see Table 4). This suggests that in the cross-section,
researchers with more patents also have more publica-
tions. In order to control for life cycle, field, and year
effects, we investigate the relationship with regression
analysis. Due to the count nature of the publication data,
we employ a negative binomial specification.21 A nega-
tive binomial regression of the form:
E(Publicationsi,t|InventorID, YearsSincePhD, Field, Year)
= exp{β1YearsSincePhDi,t + β2InventorIDi
+
∑
f
γf Fieldf +
∑
t
αtFieldf Yeart} (1)
20 Non-inventors publish on average 2.24 publications per year while
inventors publish on average 3.99 publications per year. The difference
is significant at the 1% level.
21 We first ran a Poisson specification, but a test for over dispersion
rejected the constraint of the Poisson model at the 1% level, suggesting
the need for the negative binomial specification.
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Table 3
Patent and publication summary statistics for inventors and non-inventors
Inventors Non-inventors All
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Annual publications 3.99 5.18 2.24 2.96 3.12 4.32
Annual patents 0.56 1.55 0 0 0.28 1.14
Total publications 79.93 84.78 43.71 47.72 62.00 71.30
Total patents 11.02 16.21 0 0 5.57 12.77
Table 4
Correlations of current and lagged publications and patents
Pubt Pubt−1 Pubt−2 Pubt−3 Patst Patst−1 Patst−2 Patst−3
Pubt 1
Pubt−1 0.78 1
Pubt−2 0.77 0.78 1
Pubt−3 0.72 0.78 0.78 1
Patst 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.30 1
0.30
0.31
0.31Patst−1 0.30 0.32 0.31
Patst−2 0.28 0.29 0.31
Patst−3 0.26 0.28 0.28
describes a reduced form of the observable determi-
nants of publications in a year, where Publicationsi,t is
the number of publications in year t for researcher i,
InventorIDi is a dummy variable equal to one in all years
for researchers that are ever listed as an inventor on a
patent, YearsSincePhDi,t is equal to the number years
since the PhD date for faculty person i in year t, Fieldi is
a dummy variable equal to 1 for faculty members in field
f, and Fieldf Yeart is a field-year dummy variable equal
to one for observations of faculty members in field f in
year t.22 This interaction variable allows the year effects
to vary by field.
Results of this pooled analysis are reported in
Table 6.23 As one would expect, the number of pub-
lications per year increases with the years since a
researcher’s PhD date, but at a decreasing rate over
time.24 Confirming the difference in means reported
above, inventor sample faculty members generate,
on average, significantly more publications per year.
22 The fields of discipline for faculty in our sample are
Mechanical Engineering, Computer Science/Electrical Engineering,
Medical, Chemistry, Biomedical/Genetics/Microbiology, Chemical
Engineering/Materials Science, Physics, Other Science, and Behav-
ioral/Philosophy/Cognitive Science. Note that the matching for the
control sample was done on much more detailed fields, such as genetics
or inorganic chemistry.
23 Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, are reported, allow-
ing for correlation across the observations for each individual.
24 This is consistent with the findings of Levin and Stephan (1991)
with respect to the publication life cycle of academic researchers.0.59 1
0.52 0.59 1
0.41 0.49 0.57 1
Even when controls for recent publication activity are
included, as in column (2), faculty members that are ever
inventors on a patent generate more publications. These
results suggest that the inventors in our sample are more
prolific in terms of annual publications, to the order of
25–70% more publications, than their non-inventor col-
leagues, consistent with the results of Meyer (2006).25
These pooled results suggest that there are some con-
sistent differences across faculty members in the sample.
In the following analyses, we control for the time-
invariant difference between researchers with researcher
level fixed effects, estimating the relationship between
changes in a researcher’s annual publications and various
measures of that researcher’s patenting activity, control-
ling for field, year, and the overall career pattern of
publication activity.
5.1. Relationship between patenting and publishing
activity
In this section, we examine the evidence with respect
to whether publication and patenting are complements
or substitutes for individual faculty members. The condi-
tional mean of the negative binomial publication function
25 A model allowing for self-selection into being an inventor, pre-
dicting inventorship using the number of patents held by the faculty
members’ degree granting institution, the first year in which the grad-
uate degree granting institution employed 0.5 full time employees in a
technology transfer office, and the prior patents of the faculty members’
current institution, yields a consistent result.
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Table 5
Summary statistics for full sample, inventor sample, and non-inventor sample
Full sample Inventors Non-inventors
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Annual publications 3.12 4.32 3.99 5.18 2.24 2.96
#Cites/publication 31.07 118.32 34.92 109.33 27.13 126.73
Cumulative publication 28.75 46.24 36.57 56.57 20.78 30.49
Annual patents 0.28 1.13 0.56 1.54 0 0
Annual university patents 0.22 0.98 0.43 1.35 0 0
Annual industry patents 0.05 0.41 0.10 0.58 0 0
Annual unassigned patents 0.02 0.18 0.03 0.25 0 0
Cumulative #patents 0.34 1.27 0.67 1.72 0 0
Years since PhD 14.62 9.42 14.87 9.54 14.37 9.29
Table 6
Inventor and non-inventor faculty publications, pooled results
(1) (2)
Inventor ID 0.539 (0.099)** 0.226 (0.049)**
YearsSincePhD 0.109 (0.013)** 0.028 (0.009)**
YearsSincePhD2 −0.002 (0.000)** −0.001 (0.000)**
#pubst−1 0.073 (0.006)**
#pubst−2 0.056 (0.007)**
#pubst−3 0.025 (0.007)**
Constant −0.055 (0.347) 0.223 (0.310)
Observations 5461 4561
Unit of observation is the individual-year for the 1975–1995 period.
Dependent variable is the count of the number of publications in year t
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ond estimation is performed using a negative binomial model. Robust
tandard errors, clustered by individual, in parentheses; **significant
t 1%. All equations include field and field-year fixed effects.
or researcher i in year t is
(Pubs|Patents, YearsSincePhD, FEi)
= exp{β1YearsSincePhDi,t + β2PostPati,t} (2)
here YearsSincePhDi,t is the same as above. The
Ei are research-level fixed effects, controlling for the
nobserved heterogeneity across individuals, such as dif-
erences in ability or type of research. This effectively
akes the estimation one of predicting with researcher
ifferences. We estimate this equation using conditional
xed effects Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estima-
ion. This functional form is quite flexible and makes
ew restrictions, while allowing for correlation in the
ariance–covariance matrix to adjust the standard errors
or the possibility of correlation across observations of
given individual.26
26 For more information on conditional fixed effects Poisson
uasi-maximum likelihood estimation, see http://econpapers.repec.
rg/software/bocbocode/s456821.htm.Fig. 4. Trends of pre-patent annual publications for control and inven-
tor samples.
This empirical strategy relies on comparing the pre-
and post-patenting publication activity of an inven-
tor to evaluate whether or not there are significant
changes in publication activity. As in other differences-
in-differences work, this methodology relies on a control
sample not affected by patenting, the non-inventor fac-
ulty members. In order for this approach to be valid,
the pretreatment (here pre-patent) slope of the depen-
dent variable must be indistinguishable between the
treatment (inventor) and control sample. Based on a
graphical investigation of the annual average number
of patents per researcher in the control and inventor
samples during the pre-patent period, the trends on
the pre-period are the same for the two sets of indi-
viduals (see Fig. 4).27 We also test the similarity of
pre-patent trends with a regression of the annual pub-
lication count in each pre-patent year on the relevant
time variable (years since publication) and this variable
27 We identified the pre-patent year for the control sample based on
the first patent of the matched inventor.
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interacted with an inventor indicator variable, controlling
for year effects, field-year effect, and individual-level
fixed effects. The results indicate that the slope of the
number of publications generated per year is not signif-
icantly different between the inventor and non-inventor
sample during the pre-patent years, justifying the use of
the difference-in-differences approach. The fact that the
patent application(s) of each inventor occurs in a dif-
ferent year of his or her career allows us to distinguish
between temporal shocks and changes associated with
patenting.
We test three specifications of the patenting variable.
The first, PostPati,t, is an indicator for all years follow-
ing the first patent of an inventor. The coefficient on this
variable reflects a shift in the average publication pro-
duction for the research from pre- to post-first patent. In
some specifications we replace PostPati,t with either a
variable equal to the number of patents in the current-
year, Patentsi,t, or the cumulative number of patents
held by the inventor, Cum.Patentsi,t−1, and the square of
this term. Including the contemporaneous patenting vari-
able explores the short-term change in publications by
the researcher. The cumulative number of prior patents
allows an examination of the change in publication activ-
ity for faculty members that are repeat patenters.28
As a dependent variable, we employ the number of
publications in year t by researcher i, Pubsi,j. A z-test
for significance of exp(β2) indicates the significance of
a within-researcher difference in publishing before and
after a patent (or alternatively the significance of con-
temporaneous or cumulative impact effects). Inclusion
of the non-patenting control sample members improves
the estimation of the life cycle of publication described
by the years since PhD variables, and also helps estimate
the average year effects.29
Table 7 reports the results of the researcher fixed
effects estimates for the annual number of publications.
In all equations, the life cycle pattern (i.e. the relation-
ship between years since PhD and publications) is the
same as above. In the first equation, the coefficient on
PostPati,t is positive and significant, indicating that after
28 Note that matching patent and publication data on the time dimen-
sion is tricky. We follow Agrawal and Henderson (2002) matching
the publication year of articles with the application year of patents. In
order to meet patent requirements, patenting researchers do not want
to publish their research prior to applying for the patent, so the publi-
cation date will be contemporaneous with or later than the application
date for related research. We evaluate the sensitivity of results to this
timing assumption below.
29 Note that for members of the control sample, the patenting variables
are always equal to zero.h Policy 37 (2008) 914–931
controlling for time-invariant unobserved researcher
characteristics, publications per year are greater fol-
lowing a researcher’s first patent by 20%. The second
equation includes the log of the current-year patents
by the researcher, Patentsi,t, the coefficient of which is
positive and significant. Both of these results confirm
Hypothesis 1 and contradict Hypothesis 2. Eq. (3) reports
the results using the cumulative count of patents by
the researcher through the prior year, Cum.Patentsi,t−1,
and this term squared. The linear term is not signifi-
cant, very small in magnitude, and the squared term is
small, negative and significant only at the 6% level.30
This does not provide support for Hypothesis 3 and sug-
gest that only in the most extreme cases, in terms of
the cumulative number of patents, is the relationship
negative.
In order to make sure that our results are not
sensitive to the nature of the control group, we re-
estimated Eq. (2) using only the inventors in the
sample. The results, reported in column (4) are consis-
tent with the results when we use the control sample.
Not surprisingly, the magnitude of the coefficient is
smaller because all individuals in the inventor sam-
ple are “treated” at some point. These results indicate
that the number of publications is not lower, and in
fact appears to be higher, following a patent by a
researcher.31
One potential concern is that the members of the
control sample may be substantially different from the
inventors in a way that biases the estimates of the control
variables, including the life cycle effects. To investi-
gate this, we re-estimated the equations allowing the
life cycle profile, as reflected in the years since PhD
variables, to differ from inventors and non-inventors
by including the interactions of these variables with an
inventor indicator variable. The results were robust to
this modification. In fact, the interaction variables were
not statistically significant, suggesting that the life cycle
profiles of inventors and non-inventors are not substan-
tially different after controlling for all other factors.
To address this concern further, we re-estimated these
equations with the sub-sample of inventing faculty (i.e.
excluding the control group members entirely). The esti-
mates corresponding to Eq. (2) are reported in Eq. (4)
30 The same relationship holds when we exclude the outlier with more
than 100 patents during the period.
31 We also investigated the possibility of a possible “dip” in publi-
cation production preceding a patent by examining the relationship
between publications and several years’ leads and lags of patenting.
There is no evidence suggesting any reduction in the number of pub-
lications produced in the 3 years prior to or following a patent.
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Table 7
Faculty publications as a function of patenting, fixed effects results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post-Patent 0.188 (0.055)**
#patentst 0.022 (0.005)** 0.018 (0.005)** 0.016 (0.005)*
Cum.Patentst−1 0.007 (0.007)
Cum.Patents2t−1 −0.000 (0.000)
#patentst−1 −0.009 (0.008)
#patentst−2 −0.002 (0.008)
#patentst−3 −0.015 (0.012)
#pubst−1 0.023 (0.004)**
#pubst−2 0.019 (0.004)**
#pubst−3 −0.005 (0.003)
YearsSincePhD 0.114 (0.010)** 0.120 (0.010)** 0.118 (0.010)** 0.133 (0.014)** 0.079 (0.010)**
YearsSincePhD2 −0.002 (0.000)** −0.002 (0.000)** −0.002 (0.000)** −0.002 (0.000)** −0.001 (0.000)**
Observations 5461 5461 5461 2758 4560
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nd confirm that the control sample is not biasing the
esults.32
The final equation in the table provides a compar-
son to the methodology employed by Agrawal and
enderson (2002), who do not find a significant rela-
ionship between the number of publications and the
ast patenting activity of the researchers investigated
t MIT. In order to compare results with our sample to
heir analysis, we estimate an equation similar to the
esults they report, including the lagged number of pub-
ications for each researcher. By including the lagged
ublications in fixed effects regression of publications
n patenting, the patenting variable can only pick up
emaining variation in the number of current publica-
ions that is not related to lagged publications. Including
his control decreases the magnitude of the coefficient
n the patenting variable, but does not eliminate the
ignificant positive relationship between patenting and
ublishing.33
32 One concern is that the number of applied research journals may
e increasing more over time than the number of theoretical research
ournals, and patenting faculty members tend to do more applied work.
f this were the case, we would expect to see publications by faculty
embers doing applied work (and patenting) increase over time. This
ould not be captured in the year effects, because those capture only
he average year effect for the each field. To account for the possibility
f differing year effects for the inventors and non-inventors, we re-
stimated Eqs. (1)–(3) using year effects interacted with an inventor
ummy equal to one in all years for inventors. Results were robust to
his flexibility.
33 Fixed effects analysis with lagged dependent variables may result
n biased estimates of the coefficients, and is especially problematic
ith count data models (see Blundell et al. (2002) and Wooldridgedent variable is the count of the number of publications in year t.
ard errors, clustered by individual, in parentheses; *significant at 5%;
Although the fixed effect controls for research-level
heterogeneity, this analysis faces the additional chal-
lenge that patenting is an endogenous choice by the
researcher. It may be the case that a faculty member
decides to apply for a patent in a particular year in
expectation of publishing a substantial set of research
in the following year(s). We cannot rule out the possibil-
ity that the results reflect a strategic choice regard when
a researcher patents their research results. Our results
must therefore be interpreted with caution and should be
interpreted as reflecting correlation, not causation.34
5.2. Variation in patents
To explore these results further, we include more
detailed information about the patents held by these
researchers. We characterize each patent as either
university-assigned, industry-assigned, or unassigned.
One might expect that university-assigned patents are
more complementary to the faculty member’s academic
research, and so these patents might be associated with
more publishing. Industry-assigned patents may rep-
(2000)). Therefore, we do not include lagged publications in our base
models and provide these estimates here for comparison with Agrawal
and Henderson (2002).
34 In exploratory analyses, we experimented with instrumenting
patenting using the cumulative number of patents applied for by each
individual’s colleague, meaning other individuals in the same field and
at the same university. Although results were consistent with those
reported here, the validity of this instrument is of concern. For example,
if one believe that the patenting activity of colleagues affects a faculty
member’s publication productivity, then this is not a valid instrument.
Due to these concerns, we elected not to report this analysis.
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Table 8
Faculty publications as a function of patenting, fixed effects results
with assignee type
(1) (2)
Post-UniversityPatent 0.162 (0.056)*
Post-IndustryPatent 0.029 (0.076)
Post-UnassignedPatent −0.103 (0.160)
#UniversityPatentst 0.027 (0.006)**
#IndustryPatentst −0.027 (0.026)
#UnassignedPatentst 0.051 (0.040)
YearsSincePhD 0.115 (0.010)** 0.121 (0.011)**
YearsSincePhD2 −0.002 (0.000)** −0.002 (0.000)**
Observations 5461 5461
Unit of observation is the individual-year for the 1975–1995 period.
Dependent variable is the count of the number of publications in year
t. Estimation performed using Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood.
Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, in parentheses; *sig-
nificant at 5%; **significant at 1%. All equations include researcher
fixed effects.
resent a deviation from traditional academic science,
and may be associated with more of a drain on the
researcher’s time, and therefore act as more of a sub-
stitute to publications. However, as discussed above,
industry-assigned patents by the researcher may also be
associated with more industry interaction, which could
prompt further research questions and may result in more
publications.
We repeated the conditional fixed effects regressions
with these more detailed counts of faculty patents, and
results are reported in Table 8. Eq. (1) includes three
dummy variables indicating the post-patent measure for
university, industry, and unassigned patents.35 Interest-
ingly, the only significant and positive coefficient is on
the university patent variable. In Eq. (2), the variables of
interest measure the number of patents of each type in the
current-year. Again, university patents are the only type
with a positive relationship with current publications.
From this analysis, it is apparent that publications do
not have the same relationship with all types of patents:
university-assigned patents appear to be complementary
to publication activity while industry and unassigned
patents do not demonstrate a significant relationship
with publications. However, this analysis does have the
limitation that 76% of the patents by inventors in the
sample were university-assigned, so the coefficients on
the industry and unassigned patents may be not precisely
estimated.
35 Note that these variables differ in a time dimension for a given
researcher. If that researcher is an inventor on a university-assigned
patent first, and later is an inventor an industry-assigned patent, the
industry patent variable is switched to one at the later time period.h Policy 37 (2008) 914–931
6. Patenting and publication quality
The results thus far demonstrate that faculty mem-
bers who patent their research do not generate fewer
publications after patenting. This discussion above also
highlighted the possibility that patenting may be asso-
ciated with a reallocation of research effort away from
fundamental, basic science to more commercial, applied
research projects. We investigate this related concern
using the number of citations to a researchers’ publica-
tions as a measure of the impact or quality of the research.
High quality, fundamental, basic science will be cited
more in future research because it is foundational, and
therefore is relied upon in follow-on work. On the other
hand, research aimed solely at a commercializable out-
come is likely to be of less value to other researchers.
If faculty members involved in patenting and commer-
cialization activities are in fact changing the focus or
compromising the quality of their research, the following
hypothesis will hold:
Hypothesis 4. The number of citations to a faculty
member’s publications will be lower following a patent
by the researcher.
In order to test this hypothesis, we collected data on
the number of citations to publications in each year by
each of the sample researchers. For the faculty members
in our sample, this includes 812,996 citations. Our unit
of analysis remains the research-year, so the dependent
variable employed is the average number of citations
per publication per year.36 We use the natural log of
this value, ln(AvgCitesi,t), in the analysis because the
skewness of the distribution of the average number of
cites. The general form of the equation to be estimated
is as follows:
ln(AvgCitesi,t)
= β1YearsSincePhDi,t + β2PostPati,t + β3Pubsi,t
+β4Pubs2i,t +
∑
t
αtFieldf Yeart + γiFEi + εi,t
(3)
This analysis controls for the number of publications by
researcher i in year t and this value squared. This is partic-
ularly appropriate for the citation analysis because (a) the
count of publications will help control for time-varying
researcher quality and (b) extremely prolific researchers
36 This is calculated as the total number of citations received as of
May, 2003 by publications in that year divided by the number of
publications made in that year for each researcher.
K.R. Fabrizio, A. Di Minin / Research Policy 37 (2008) 914–931 927
Table 9
Inventor and non-inventor faculty average citations, pooled results
(1) (2)
Inventor ID 0.348 (0.113)** −0.023 (0.077)
#pubst 0.409 (0.037)**
#pubs2t −0.012 (0.002)**
YearsSincePhD 0.094 (0.015)** 0.028 (0.012)*
YearsSincePhD2 −0.002 (0.000)** −0.001 (0.000)**
Constant 1.376 (0.518)** 1.383 (0.484)**
Observations 5461 5461
R-Squared 0.15 0.42
Unit of observation is the individual-year for the 1975–1995 period.
Dependent variable is the natural log of the number of publications
in year t, and estimation is performed using OLS. Robust standard
errors, clustered by individual, in parentheses; *significant at 5%;
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ay contribute less value added with each additional
ublication, and therefore each incremental publications
ay be cited less.
Before estimating the fixed effects model, it is use-
ul to briefly examine differences across patenting and
on-patenting faculty members in terms of the aver-
ge number of citations received. Estimates of pooled
egressions are reported in Table 9. Although on aver-
ge inventors’ publications are cited more heavily (Eq.
1)), this does not hold once the publication activity of
he faculty member is controlled for. Including controls
or the current publication production of the researcher,
reasonable proxy for researcher quality, the number
f citations received by inventors is not distinguishable
rom the number received by non-inventors. Note that
he expected curvilinear relationship between publica-
ions and average number of citations per publication is
onfirmed.
Results including researcher level fixed effects are
eported in Table 10. We again consider three mea-
ure of relevant patenting activity: before and after the
rst patent for an inventor (PostPati,t), contemporane-
us patenting (#patentsi,j), and the cumulative number
f patents by the inventor (Cum.Patentsi,j). For each
f the three, we estimate the equation with (Columns
4)–(6)) and without (Columns (1)–(3)) controls for
urrent publication activity. Without the controls for
urrent publications, there is evidence of a greater
umber of citations to publications in the year of a
atent application (column 2). Once controls for the cur-
ent publication activity are included (Columns (4)–(6))
he positive association between the average number
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Table 11
Comparison to Agrawal & Henderson results for citations per publication
Cum.Cites (1) Cum.Cites (2) Cites/Pub (3) Cites/Pub (4)
Deprec.Cum.Pubst 0.005 (0.000)** −0.000 (0.000)
Deprec.Cum.Patentst 0.021 (0.008)** −0.044 (0.010)**
#pubst 0.096 (0.002)** 0.139 (0.017)**
#patentst 0.030 (0.013)* 0.008 (0.012)
#patentst−1 −0.045 (0.025) −0.053 (0.025)*
#patentst−2 0.012 (0.018) 0.001 (0.022)
#patentst−3 −0.060 (0.016)** −0.055 (0.022)*
#pubst−1 0.020 (0.006)** −0.016 (0.009)
#pubst−2 0.005 (0.006) −0.028 (0.007)**
#pubst−3 −0.004 (0.006) −0.009 (0.007)
YearsSincePhD 0.134 (0.005)** 0.113 (0.005)** 0.108 (0.015)** 0.091 (0.015)**
YearsSincePhD2 −0.003 (0.000)** −0.003 (0.000)** −0.003 (0.000)** −0.002 (0.000)**
Constant −1.412 (0.042)** −1.300 (0.042)** 1.446 (0.135)** 1.383 (0.132)**
Observations 5461 5461 4561 4561
Unit of observation is the individual-year for the 1975–1995 period. Dependent variable in (1) and (2) is the log of the depreciated cumulative count
of citation to publications through year t. Estimation method is negative binomial. Dependent variable in (3) and (4) is the log of the average number
OLS. S
er fixedof citations received by publications in year t. Estimation method is
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1%. All equations include research
in average number of citations received following an
inventor’s first patent (Eq. (3)). However, the cumulative
number of patents by the faculty members is signifi-
cantly and negatively related to the number of citations
received.
Therefore, the results testing Hypothesis 4 are mixed.
The evidence suggests that there is no average change
in citation intensity following an inventor’s first patent.
However, if a researcher patents repeatedly, then the
average citation intensity is lower, suggesting a possi-
ble decline in research quality or impact. These results
are contradictory to those reported in Agrawal and
Henderson (2002). In their analysis of citations to pub-
lications, those authors regress the depreciated stock
of citations on the depreciated stock of papers and the
depreciated stock of patents.37 They find a positive coef-
ficient on this measure of patenting activity. Eq. (1) in
Table 11 provides a comparable analysis with our data
set. The coefficient on the depreciated stock of patents is
positive and significant, in agreement with Agrawal and
Henderson’s results. However, further analysis suggests
that this result is not robust to controlling for current
publication activity. Eq. (2) includes the current-year
publications of the researcher. With this control, the evi-
dence suggests a negative and significant relationship
between the depreciated stock of patents and depreci-
37 Agrawal and Henderson use a 20% annual depreciation rate, and
include citations, papers, and patents through the current year. We do
the same here.tandard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual in (3) and (4);
effects.
ated stock of paper citations, consistent with the results
reported above.
Eqs. (3) and (4) examine this further using the
average citations for the dependent variable and
examining the relationship to several lags of patents
and publications by the researcher. Recent and current
counts of publications are highly correlated with average
citations to current publications, perhaps reflecting the
recent quality of the researcher, but current patents
are not significant. This suggests that the citation of
current publications may be more related to recent
publication activity than to patenting. In addition, there
is some evidence that during the years following a
patent application, the average number of citations to a
faculty member’s publications falls (Eq. (4)).
7. Limitations
This empirical analysis attempts to make inferences
about the factors influencing the publication behav-
ior of faculty members over time. There are no doubt
unobserved factors influencing both publishing and
patenting for these individuals. We have attempted to
provide analyses robust to these concerns by using
researcher level fixed effects to control for unob-
served heterogeneity across researchers, exploratory
analysis using instrumental variables to instrument the
endogenous decision to patenting, and confirming the
robustness of the results to limiting the analysis to the
sub-sample of faculty inventors. However, we caution
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gainst attributing strong causality to the results. With-
ut further analysis of the mechanisms underpinning
he noted increased in publication production follow-
ng patenting, the reasons for such an increase remain
peculative.
. Conclusion
The Bayh-Dole Act and increasing collaboration
etween industry and university researchers have served
o dramatically increase patenting by university fac-
lty members. As patenting has grown, so has concern
bout the possible negative effects on the generation
nd publication of fundamental research results by fac-
lty members. How the change in norms has impacted
he open publication and use of university research
esults is a matter of concern for policy makers and
rm managers in need of accessing university research
esults.
This research contributes to the existing literature by
roviding an empirical investigation of faculty patent-
ng and publishing with a data set containing inventors
rom multiple fields at many institutions in many fields
cross many years. Our results confirm the results in
ome existing work, contradict others, and extend the
xisting literature. The results presented here are not con-
istent with the concern that the publication activity of
aculty researchers would fall with increasing patenting
ctivity. The annual number of publications by a fac-
lty member is in fact higher following application for
successful patent, controlling for field, year, and time
rofile of publications by matched non-inventors. Again,
e stress that this should be interpreted as a correlation,
s we cannot test or assert causation from this analy-
is. This result is consistent with other recent studies of
aculty patenting.
Interestingly, results here demonstrate that univer-
ity patents (and not corporate or unassigned patents)
rive the positive relationship. This suggests that the
ositive relationship is not attributable to academic
esearchers gaining new insights and ideas from work-
ng with industry researchers. If that were the case, we
hould expect to see at least an equal positive rela-
ionship between industry-assigned patents and faculty
ublications. Since the same research often underlies
ublications and patents, this result may indicate that
he research embodied in university-assigned patents is
loser to academic research, which yields subsequent
ublications. The results may also be driven by uni-
ersity technology licensing offices electing to patent
he most promising research results, which are also
ssociated with more publications, and passing on lessh Policy 37 (2008) 914–931 929
promising results, which are then either patented with-
out an assignee or picked up by a corporation that
appears as the assignee on the granted patent. Further
research into the mechanisms responsible for the differ-
ences across types of patents is needed to examine these
possibilities.
The relationship between patenting and citations to
publications suggests that there is not a large-scale shift
to lower quality or less impactful research following
an inventor’s first patent. However, faculty members
that repeatedly patent their research results generate
publications that receive fewer citations. This may be
an indication that these faculty members are in fact
re-focusing their research on more applied or com-
mercializable research, at the expense of fundamental
science. It may also be a result of increasing intellec-
tual property rights inhibiting the use of their published
research results in follow-on studies. This evidence is
contradictory to the limited prior evidence concern-
ing the relationship between patenting and the quality
or impact of faculty publications, but is consistent
with the results of Murray and Stern (2005), who
present an analysis of matched publication and patents
covering the same research result. Their results sug-
gest that citations to papers decrease when a patent
related to the same research is granted. This is con-
sistent with the interpretation that increasing patent
protection to a faculty member’s research results is
associated with fewer citations to that individual’s
publications.
Comparing these results with Agrawal and Henderson
(2002) suggests that the relationship between faculty
patenting and publishing may be different for faculty
members in general than it is for faculty at elite institu-
tions, such as MIT. Perhaps one reason is that patenting,
licensing, and commercialization activities may allow a
faculty member access to more industry funding. MIT
faculty may not be as constrained by limited funding as
researchers at other schools, and they therefore benefit
less from added access to funding. There are likely to
be other institutional differences driving the variation in
results as well. In a comparison between Stanford and
Berkeley Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
departments, Kenney and Goe (2003) find that a differ-
ent attitude towards commercialization partially explains
the more intense technology transfer activities at Stan-
ford. In Europe, Debackere and Veugelers (2005) find
convincing evidence that universities allocating a higher
percentage of royalties to inventors are more effec-
tive in technology transfer activities. Further research
will consider the alternative explanations for the noted
increase in publications following a patent application,
Researc930 K.R. Fabrizio, A. Di Minin /
as well as an evaluation of possible differences across
institutions of varying quality. Based on the evidence
presented here, increasing faculty members’ incentives
to patent research results does not seem to be overwhelm-
ing the incentives for faculty members to publish their
research.
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